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                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                           ___________ 
 
                      Nos. 00-2393 & 00-2399 
                           ___________ 
 
 
                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
                      DAVID J. FITZGERALD, 
                                   Appellant at No. 00-2393 
 
                         LENWOOD MALACHI, 
                                   Appellant at No. 00-2399 
 
         _______________________________________________ 
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
         D.C. Criminal Nos. 99-cr-00450-7 & 99-cr-00450-6 
                  (Honorable Harvey Bartle, III) 
                       ___________________ 
 
 
         Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                        December 13, 2001 
 
           Before:  SCIRICA and BARRY, Circuit Judges, 
                   and MUNLEY, District Judge* 
 
 
                                            
 
     *The Honorable James M. Munley, United States District Judge for the 
Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
                   (Filed:   January 31, 2002) 
 
                        __________________ 
 
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                        __________________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
     These drug trafficking cases require application of the rule stated 
in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
     At a bench trial, defendants Lenwood Malachi and David Fitzgerald 
were 
convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. In its verdict, the 
District Court found 
defendants were guilty of distributing "large quantities of marijuana." 
The court made no 
more specific findings with respect to drug quantities. Before the trial, 
defendants and the 
government agreed that the District Court would make findings of drug 
quantity at 
sentencing. 
     Following the verdicts, but before sentencing, the United States 
Supreme Court 
decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Court held, 
"'[I]t is 
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment 
of facts that 
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant 
is exposed. It is 
equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" 
Id. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., 
concurring)).  
     As noted, the District Court made no findings at trial on specific 
drug quantities. 
Because of Apprendi, the government asked the court to supplement its 
findings to 
establish drug quantities, and to make, for these purposes, only such 
findings as could be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, the District Court 
again stated 
defendants had trafficked "large quantities," but declined to make a 
specific finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to quantity.  
     The relevant statute establishes different ranges of punishments 
depending on the 
amount of drugs involved. 21 U.S.C.  841. The maximum punishment for 
trafficking 
less than fifty kilograms of marijuana is five years, or ten years if the 
defendant has 
previously been convicted of a felony drug offense.  841(b)(1)(D). If 
there is more than 
one thousand kilograms of marijuana which the government alleges 
represents the 
actual quantity distributed the maximum prescribed sentence is life 
imprisonment. 
 841(b)(1)(A). 
     The District Court made findings with respect to quantity only under 
the 
preponderance of evidence standard. The District Court found Malachi 
conspired to 
distribute 1400 kilograms of marijuana, and Fitzgerald conspired to 
distribute 2600 
kilograms of marijuana, by a preponderance of the evidence. 
     As initially calculated, the guidelines for Malachi specified a range 
of 121-150 
months; for Fitzgerald, 168-210 months. Because there was no finding of 
drug quantity 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the District Court believed its authority after 
Apprendi was 
constrained by the statutory maximum for trafficking less than fifty 
kilograms of 
marijuana. For this reason, it sentenced Malachi to five years, the 
maximum for such a 
quantity absent a prior felony drug conviction. Because Fitzgerald had a 
prior felony drug 
conviction, it sentenced him to ten years, the maximum permitted for 
trafficking under 
fifty kilograms of marijuana. Defendants appeal. 
     In United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 2000), we held 
Apprendi does 
not apply where a relevant factor raises the maximum statutory penalty, so 
long as the 
sentence actually imposed remains at or below the maximum applicable when 
the factor 
is not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 863. Because the 
District Court here 
imposed a sentence within the maximum statutory range for trafficking less 
than fifty 
kilograms of marijuana, Apprendi does not apply. 
     Defendants seek to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the District 
Court's 
verdict amounted to an acquittal of any charge that they conspired to 
traffic more than 
fifty kilograms of marijuana. It follows, they argue, that the District's 
finding of 
substantially greater amounts of marijuana for purposes of application of 
the sentencing 
guidelines which raised their sentences up to the statutory maxima 
amounted to 
double jeopardy, insofar as it negated the effect of the "acquittal." 
There is no basis, 
however, for defendants' claim that they were acquitted of trafficking 
more than fifty 
kilograms of marijuana. 
     Furthermore, an "acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from 
considering 
conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been 
proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 
(1997). 
Accordingly, it was appropriate to determine the applicable sentence 
(within the 
constraints imposed by the statute) based on an amount of marijuana found 
by a 
preponderance of the evidence, though not beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
is simply a 
consequence of the different standards of proof employed. 
     Defendants contend the lack of a specific finding on quantity bars 
conviction under 
 841(b)(1)(D), which applies to trafficking less than fifty kilograms. 
They argue they can 
be convicted only under  841(b)(4), which applies to defendants who have 
"distribut[ed] 
a small quantity of marihuana for no remuneration," because their 
responsibility for more 
than "a small quantity" has not been established beyond a reasonable 
doubt. But the 
District Court expressly found at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendants 
conspired to distribute "large quantities" of marijuana a finding 
inconsistent with 
application of  841(b)(4). This was consistent with the evidence 
presented at trial. 
     Fitzgerald also contests the court's application of the higher 
statutory maximum by 
reason of a previous conviction for drug-related felonies. The basis for 
his argument is 
that the prior conviction which Fitzgerald does not now contest was not 
noted in the 
indictment, and was not established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. In 
Apprendi, 
however, the Court excepted from its rule prior convictions: "Other than 
the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be   proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 
490 
(emphasis added). The Court declined to overrule its previous decision 
that prior 
conviction need not be so treated. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
523 U.S. 224 
(1998). Whatever misgivings the Court may have expressed about that 
decision in 
Apprendi are, for these purposes, irrelevant. The Apprendi Court expressly 
declined to 
overrule it, and we are therefore bound by it. 530 U.S. at 489-490. 
     Accordingly, the judgments of sentence will be affirmed.
                                         
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
          Please file the foregoing opinion. 
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